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The Note argues that the Toshiba and Krongsberg sales illustrate the critical need of Western
allies to agree on a functional means of promoting international trade without compromising inter-
national security. Part I examines the illegal sale of ship building technology to the Soviey Union
by Toshiba. Part II discusses how COCOM works. Part III analyzes current coproate, national,
and multilateral efforts to enhance the effectiveness of export controls. This Note concludes that to
prevent future violations, the member nations of COCOM should adjust their export control poli-
cies to reflect changes in technological progress and should strive to achieve greater unification in
their policies and goals.




InJanuary 1988, representatives of sixteen nations-Japan
and all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")
nations except for Iceland-met in Paris to discuss methods of
improving the control of exports of militarily significant tech-
nology to the Soviet Union and its allies.' These nations to-
gether form the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Ex-
port Controls ("COCOM"), an organization designed to pre-
vent Eastern-bloc and other nations from acquiring crucial
Western technology. 2 The meeting was held in the wake of the
recent illegal sales of strategic technology to the Soviet Union
by the Toshiba Machine Company ofJapan ("Toshiba"), a sub-
sidiary of the Toshiba Corporation, and the Kongsberg
Vaapenfabrik Company ("Kongsberg") of Norway.'
This Note argues that the Toshiba and Kongsberg sales
illustrate the critical need of Western allies to agree on a func-
tional means of promoting international trade without com-
promising international security.4 Part I examines the illegal
sale of shipbuilding technology to the Soviet Union by
Toshiba. Part II discusses how COCOM works. Part III ana-
lyzes current corporate, national, and multilateral efforts to en-
hance the effectiveness of export controls. This Note con-
cludes that to prevent future violations, the member nations of
COCOM should adjust their export control policies to reflect
1. Farnsworth, West Is Easing Policy on Sales to Soviet Bloc, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1988, at D6, cols. 5-6; A Littler List, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1988, at 67. "Militarily sig-
nificant" means that an item, if modified, could be used in military equipment. See
Farnsworth, supra.
2. Recent Development, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 197, 197 (1986). COCOM
members include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Tur-
key, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 197 n.4.
3. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, cols. 5-6; A Littler List, supra note 1, at 67.
4. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G AND INST. OF
MEDICINE, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT
CONTROLS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION 3-4 (1987) [hereinafter BALANCING
THE NATIONAL INTEREST]; Bonker, Protecting Economic Interests, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND
TECH., Fall 1986, at 96.
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changes in technological progress and should strive to achieve
greater unification in their policies and goals.
I. TOSHIBA MACHINE COMPANY'S ILLEGAL SALE
TO THE SOVIET UNION
In April 1981, Toshiba and the Soviet Union signed an
agreement for the purchase and delivery of four computerized
milling machines to the Soviet Union.5 The machines are used
for the rough milling of ship propellers. 6 They are also capa-
ble of improving the performance of the Soviet Union's mis-
sile-carrying nuclear submarines.' The Soviet Union re-
quested both the MBP-1 10 model, with its nine-axis simultane-
ous numerical control,8 and the five-axis MF series machines. 9
COCOM explicitly banned the export of both of these ma-
chines to the Soviet bloc because of their military usefulness.10
The Soviet Union also approached Kongsberg, a firm owned
5. Sanger, A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to Russians, N.Y. Times,June 12, 1987,
at DIO, col. 2; Investigation Into Sales Of Propeller Milling Machines To The Soviet
Union By Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., Report to the President and Directors of
Toshiba Corporation, 23-24 (Aug. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Toshiba Report] (available
at the Fordham International Law Journal office).
6. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 9.
Propellers are generally cast out of bronze or stainless steel but they cannot
be successfully cast to the precise dimensions necessary to achieve their de-
sign function. Therefore, after casting, the propellers must be milled and
ground to achieve their final dimensions and smoothness. Propellers can be
ground entirely with a hand held power tool. However, hand grounding of
propellers requires a team of highly skilled craftsmen, and is an extremely
slow process. The basic milling function is more efficiently performed by an
automated propeller milling machine.
Id.
7. For a discussion of how performance is improved, see infra note 22.
8. Sanger supra note 5, at DI0, col. 2; Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 14. A
numerical controller gives commands to an automated milling machine. Toshiba Re-
port, supra note 5, at 9. The numerical controller directs the machine's milling head
along a series of paths or axes as it mills propellers of a specific shape. Id. An axis is a
direction of the path taken by either the milling head or the turntable on which the
propeller is placed and on which it rotates under the milling head. Id. As a result,
depending upon the number of turning axes, ,the milling head can move up and
down, side to side, and can be rotated or tilted. Id. Consequently, multi-axis ma-
chines have a milling head capable of turning a greater number of directions and thus
can more quickly cover the areas needed to be milled. Id.
9. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 29-32.
10. See Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 11; see, e.g., the United States Commod-
ity Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1, Group 0, ECCN 1091A (1988) (describ-
ing the U.S. application of COCOM rules).
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by the Norwegian government, about purchasing computer
equipment that was also banned by COCOM." The Soviet
Union intended to mate the Norwegian computer controls with
the Japanese milling machines, a further violation of COCOM
rules. 12
In May 1981, Toshiba submitted an application to the Jap-
anese Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI")
in Tokyo for a permit to ship another milling machine, the
TDP 70/110, to the Soviet Union.' 3  The application stated
that export of the TDP 70/110 did not violate COCOM rules
forbidding certain goods from being sent to Eastern-bloc
countries.14 MITI granted the permit under the assumption
that this was the actual item being delivered.' 5 None of the
trade ministry's thirty export-control inspectors, who review
200,000 applications a year, challenged the application. 16
By December 1983, two of the MBP-1 10 machines had
been installed at the Baltic Factory in Leningrad. 17 The Soviet
11. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 15-16; Sanger, supra note 5, at D10, col. 2;
Toshiba Machine Employees Arrested for COCOM Violations, (May 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Asahi News Service file).
12. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 14; see also Toshiba Machine Employees Arrested
for COCOM Violations, supra note 11 (the use of the Norwegian-made computer con-
trols also violated COCOM rules). "This arrangement would entail circumvention of
Norway's export regulations, since Norway, as a member of COCOM, has COCOM-
related export regulations similar to those ofJapan and the United States." Toshiba
Report, supra note 5, at 16; see, e.g. United States Commodity Control List, 15 C.F.R.
§ 399.1, Supp. 1, Group 0, ECCN 1091A (explaining the rules concerning COCOM
regulation).
13. Sanger, supra note 5, at DI0, col. 2; Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 25.
14. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 25-26 (a machine that has fewer than three
axes is not banned from export); see, e.g., United States Commodity Control List, 15
C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1, Group 0, ECCN 1091A (detailing the export policy of the
United States). Attached to the application were: (a) a letter certifying that the
machine would be installed in the factory of Electrosila in Leningrad (a heavy electric
apparatus company) and would not be used to manufacture war materials and goods;
(b) a copy of the formal contract; (c) a copy of the TDP 70/110 specifications showing
the machine to be a nine-axis vertical boring and turning machine possessing only
two simultaneously controlled axes; (d) a statement by Kongsberg as computer con-
troller (numerical controller) manufacturer that the model is in accordance with the
specifications and export restrictions set down by COCOM; and (e) a document from
Toshiba Machine Co., bearing the President's seal, detailing the relationship between
the machine and the export regulations and certifying that the machine was exporta-
ble under such regulations. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 25-26.
15. See Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 26.
16. Sanger, supra note 5, at DI0, col. 2.
17. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 27.
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Union later installed the other nine-axis machines in a different
area of the factory.' 8 The five-axis MF-series milling machines,
purchased in April 1983, were also approved for export from
Japan by using the same method of misrepresenting the actual
items.'". By late 1984, all five of the MF-series machines were
operational in Leningrad.2" These sales remained undetected
until December 1985, when they were disclosed to the
COCOM chairman by a former employee of the trading com-
pany used by Toshiba.2'
Since the Toshiba incident was uncovered in December
1985, the United States has publicly denounced the company's
role in breaching Western security. 22 In June 1987, the U.S.
Senate voted stiff penalties against Toshiba and Kongsberg, 2
3
and both the Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives are
currently considering other penalties.24
While the Toshiba/Kongsberg sale is the most visible vio-
18. Id.
19. .See Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 31.
20. Id. at 32.
21. Jameson, Shock Waves from Toshiba-Soviet Deal Still Rattle Japan, L.A. Times,
Aug. 11, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 1; Sanger, supra note 5, at DI0, col. 5. The sale was
disclosed by Kazuo Kumagai, the Moscow office manager of the Wako Koeki trading
firm, which represented Toshiba in the illegal sale. Sanger, supra note 5, at DI0, col.
5.
22. Jameson, supra note 21, at 1, col. 3. The United States claimed that the ma-
chines that Toshiba Machine Co. sold to the Soviet Union helped to improve the
Soviets' submarine warfare capacity. Id. at 1, col. 2; Crossette, Weinberger Blames Japa-
nese for Compromising Security, N.Y. Times,June 30, 1987, at A14, col. 1. But see Maritime
Analysts Doubt Claims Against Toshiba Machine (July 20, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Asahi News Service file) (doubt has grown as experts match the schedules for the
construction of two Soviet submarines and their entrance into the fleet with the tim-
ing of the delivery of the Toshiba milling equipment to the Soviet Union). One of the
main sources of a submarine's noise is its spinning propeller blade as it cuts through
water. Sanger, supra note 5, at page D10, cols. 3-4; Browne, Furor Over Sale Casts a
Spotlight on Race for Silence in Seas, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1987, at C3, col. 1. The per-
formance of the submarine was enhanced as a result of quieter propellers. Sanger,
supra note 5, at page DI0, cols. 3-4; Browne, supra, at C3, col. 1. The milling ma-
chines allowed the Soviet Union to produce quieter propellers in less time. Sanger,
supra note 5, at page DI0, cols. 3-4; Browne, supra, at C3, col. 1.
23. On Trade: Wrong, Long Arm of the Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1988, at A20, col.
1 [hereinafter On Trade]; see also Hara, News Report (July 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Asahi News Service file) (discussing a two-year ban on Toshiba imports that
passed in the U.S. Senate).
24. Farnsworth, Trade Conferees in Congress Agree on Toshiba Curbs, N.Y. Times, Apr.
1, 1988, at Al, col. 4 (this bill will ban all sales of goods produced by the Toshiba
Machine Corporation in the United States).
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lation of COCOM's rules, it is not the first.25 Because many
Japanese businessmen believe that the COCOM rules have
been unilaterally imposed on Japan by the United States,26
they have "a rather loose attitude toward export restrictions,
not only within the Toshiba Machine Co. but within Japanese
corporations in general. ' 27 Indeed, according to the individ-
ual who disclosed the illegal Toshiba sale, of the more than
fifty Japanese firms that do business in Moscow, "there is prob-
ably not a single one that has never violated Japanese govern-
ment laws and regulations concerning export restrictions. ' 28
Furthermore, Japan and Norway are not the only member
nations in which there have been violations of the COCOM re-
strictions. France has often violated COCOM rules.2 9 In addi-
tion, the British government has allowed the sale of Spey en-
gines, manufactured by Rolls Royce Ltd., as well as Harrier
Jets to the People's Republic of China without considering the
COCOM process.30 Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, and
France regularly issue licenses for high-technology trade exhi-
bitions despite their awareness that a resulting sale might not
meet the unanimousapproval required by COCOM.3 I Finally,
many member nations routinely circumvent COCOM policy
when conflicting domestic issues present themselves.3 2 Some
of COCOM's rules are clearly at odds with the growth of inter-
national trade.33
25. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
26. Jameson, supra note 21, at 4, col. 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 206 n.56; see infra text accompanying
note 84.
30. McIntyre & Cupitt, East-West Strategic Trade Control: Crumbling Consensus?, 25
SURVEY 81, 102 (1980).
31. Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of the
COCOM Regime, 9 FLETCHER F. 105, 111-12 (1985) (discussing conflicts in national
styles of export control, and suggesting that France does not even like to admit that
COCOM exists); McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 102.
32. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 91, 102 (in some of the participating
countries there is political opposition because of the "internal constitutional and
legal regimes" of those countries).
33. Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN AFF.
894, 905, 906 (1979); Bucy, Technology Transfer and East-West Trade: A Reappraisal, 5
INT'L SECURTy 132, 148 (1981); McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 91, 102.
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II. COCOM
COCOM, an organization headquartered in Paris, has tra-
ditionally kept many of its activities secret. 34 However, since
the Toshiba incident, several details concerning the organiza-
tion have come to light.
A. The Organization
COCOM is an informal body that is based upon a volun-
tary agreement between the United States, Japan, and all the
NATO member nations except Iceland." Created in 1949 at
the insistence of the United States, its main task is to deny the
Soviet Union and its allies any item that would enhance those
nations' military capabilities.3 6 To that end, COCOM main-
tains three lists of items that it has determined should not be
exported to Eastern-bloc nations.3 7
The International Atomic Energy List includes radioactive
material; 8 the International Munitions List itemizes actual
weapon systems;39 and the International List contains "dual-
use" items, that is, items that have both military and commer-
cial use, such as Toshiba's milling machines. 40 The Interna-
tional List is the most controversial, and the most subject to
change during periodic list reviews. 4' During all list reviews
technical experts are called upon to give advice concerning
34. G. SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DICTIONARY & DIRECTORY
67 (2d ed. 1986); Aeppel, supra note 31, at 108; Bingham &Johnson, supra note 33, at
904; Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of COCOM, 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1285, 1287 (1983). But see Farnsworth, supra note 1, at A 1, col. 5 (the once secret
COCOM lists of embargoed goods is now being made public).
35. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 34, at 66-67; Aeppel, supra note 31, at 108; Bing-
ham &Johnson, supra note 33, at 903-04; see also Hunt, supra note 34, at 1285, 1287
(explaining that COCOM exists as an informal and voluntary arrangement).
36. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 34, at 66-67; 1 UNION OF INT'L Ass'Ns, YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS F4582g (22d ed. 1985); Hunt, supra note 34, at
1287-88.
37. REPORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PANEL OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 15, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter
PANEL REPORT]; G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 34, at 67; Hunt, supra note 34, at 1288-89;
McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 87; Recent Developments, supra note 2, at 198
n.6.
38. PANEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 87.
39. PANEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 87.
40. PANEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 87.
41. See Aeppel, supra note 31, at 109; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 90.
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particular items on the list.
42
Until 1985, list reviews took place approximately every
three years.43 That year, however, it was agreed that one out
of the three COCOM lists would be reviewed annually.44 Dur-
ing list reviews, the list changes tend to reflect technological
advances and availability of strategically-significant items to
non-COCOM countries.4 5 A member can place an item on re-
view by submitting a proposal four months in advance of the
review. 46 Forty-five days before the review meeting, concerned
members file counterproposals or proposals for consistency if
there is a discrepancy among two or more proposals.4 7
COCOM rules require that any proposal must pass by a unani-
mous vote.48 The revised list becomes effective sixty days after
it is circulated among all COCOM members. 49 Each member
nation is responsible for noting changes in the list and adher-
ing to them.50
COCOM itself lacks enforcement mechanisms. 5 ' Instead,
each member nation is responsible for enacting and enforcing
domestic export-control laws that implement COCOM's poli-
cies. 52 Each nation thus devises its own list of controlled tech-
42. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 94. List reviews, when conducted, are
used to select items to be added or deleted from the COCOM list. See Hunt, supra
note 34, at 1290-91.
43. Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology,
EUR. PARLIAMENT WORKING DOCUMENTS, ser. A, doc. A2-99/85, at 18 (Sept. 30, 1985)
[hereinafter European Parliament Report]; see also PANEL REPORT, supra note 37, at 8 (list
reviews have occurred every three years); McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 94
(same).
44. European Parliament Report, supra note 43, at 18.
45. Hunt, supra note 34, at 1289-90; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 95.
"Clearly, if the Soviets can procure an item from Sweden or Switzerland, which are
not in the COCOM system, then it becomes rather self-defeating for COCOM to
control the item." McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 95; see also Bingham &John-
son, supra note 33, at 904 (describing the criteria used to place an item on the
COCOM list).
46. Hunt, supra note 34, at 1290.
47. Id.
48. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 34, at 67; Aeppel, supra note 31, at 108-09; Hunt,
supra note 34, at 1287; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 94.
49. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 95.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 82; Aeppel, supra note 31, at 108-09; Bingham &Johnson, supra note
33, at 904.
52. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 82; see also Toshiba Report, supra note 5,
at 8 (each COCOM nation must construe and interpret the COCOM list, and as a
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nology as well as its own application of the COCOM restric-
tions.53 The United States, for instance, maintains the Com-
modity Control List, which is even more comprehensive than
that of COCOM itself.54 For years, the so-called Battle Act,55
the U.S. enforcement structure, provided the "symbolic teeth"
of COCOM. 6 The Battle Act provided for the denial of U.S.
military and economic assistance to any country that intention-
ally permitted banned goods to be shipped to the Soviet
Union.5 7 However, the Battle Act has been superseded by the
Export Administration Act of 1979,58 which is the current U.S.
enforcement mechanism.59 Recently, however, U.S. ability to
enforce compliance with COCOM rules has diminished.6 °
B. Flaws in the Organization
In recent years, COCOM rules have become a cause of
mounting frustration among member nations.6 Many mem-
bers agree with West Germany's claim that the list goes "be-
yond what is necessary,"' 62 and thus inhibits lucrative trade
with Eastern-bloc markets.63 Many U.S. policymakers, on the
result there may be differences among member countries concerning the application
of the COCOM controls).
53. Toshiba Report, supra note 5, at 8.
54. Bonker, supra note 4, at 100; Necessary Barriers, EcONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1988, at
89; Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 5. The Commodity Control List is published
and updated on a regular basis and can be found at 15 C.F.R. §§ 399.1-2 (1988). The
regulations that govern its application are located at 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-398 (1988).
The list is promulgated administratively pursuant to the Export Administration Act
of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§§ 2401-2403, 2404-2420 (West Supp. 1988) and scattered sections of 7, 22, 26, and
42 U.S.C.).
55. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, ch. 575, 65 Stat. 644 (su-
perseded 1979).
56. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 91-92.
57. See Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, ch. 575, 65 Stat. at 644.
58. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§§ 2401-2403, 2404-2420 (West Supp. 1988) and scattered sections of 7, 22, 26, and
42 U.S.C.).
59. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 91.
60. See Bucy, supra note 33, at 148. "As most of the COCOM member govern-
ments no longer receive U.S. aid, the U.S. Battle Act has lost its practical signifi-
cance." McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 92. The reason for such a loss is the
disappearance of Western Europe's fear that the denial of U.S. aid could damage its
economies. See Bucy, supra note 33, at 148.
61. Necessary Barriers, supra note 54, at 89.
62. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 6.
63. Id.
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other hand, are concerned about their allies' permissive en-
forcement of export controls.64  It is clear that COCOM is
only as strong as the national laws and enforcement mecha-
nisms that implement it and that its strength has recently been
sapped by differing export control policies.65 When COCOM
was created in 1949, three factors helped to make the United
States successful in establishing a united Western front against
the Soviet Union and its trade demands: one, the hefty contri-
bution of the U.S. economic and military assistance to NATO;
two, a widely-held perception that the Soviet Union posed a
threat to NATO's security; and three, a compact list of items
considered too crucial to export, most of which were produced
in the United States.66 Since that time, each of these premises
has been called into question.
First, Western Europe has become economically self-reli-
ant.67 Much of the technology that the United States once pro-
duced exclusively is now being produced by Western Euro-
pean nations.68 In addition, Japan's economic growth since
World War II has been phenomenal.69 Moreover, the U.S.
role in supplying military assistance to its European allies has
been questioned within both the United States and foreign na-
tions,70 leaving Western Europe to believe that its future se-
curity can be better protected by developing a working rela-
tionship with Eastern-bloc nations.7' Japan, for its part, is gov-
erned by a constitution that was written while Japan was under
U.S. occupation and that does not make national security a pri-
64. Markham, Revised Curbs on East-Bloc Trade, N. Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at DI,
col. 3.
65. Bucy, supra note 33, at 151; see also Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 5
(discussing the pressure COCOM is under from European as well as U.S. companies
to allow certain sales to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union).
66. Bucy, supra note 33, at 147; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 106.
67. See Bucy, supra note 33, at 148 (the independent economies of Western Eu-
rope have created greater need to allow more trade); Recent Development, supra
note 2, at 209 (many Western Europeans no longer feel economically or technically
dependent on the United States).
, 68. See Recent Development, supra note 2, at 209 (previously the United States
was credited with developing 70% of the technology in the world; that figure has
declined drastically).
69. Japan and America: Forget the Growl, Look at the Tails, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1988,
at 18, col. 2 [hereinafter Japan and America].
70. SeeJ. DORMAN, THE U.S. WAR MACHINE 252-63 (1978) (evaluating U.S. mili-
tary capability and its weaknesses); Bucy, supra note 33, at 148.
71. Bucy, supra note 33, at 148.
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ority. 72 Policymakers in both the United States and Japan have
recently called forJapan to assume greater responsibility for its
military security and that of its Western allies.73
Second, relations between Western allies and the Soviet
Union have begun to thaw. Because of disarmament and other
Soviet initiatives, General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev
seems "less adversarial than his predecessors. 74 In addition,
many Western governments and companies are eager to re-
spond to his request for aid from the West in an effort to
restructure the Soviet Union's economy and provide more
goods for its consumers.75
Third, COCOM's original dual-use list has grown too
large to be either manageable or economical. 76  COCOM
members have made efforts in recent years to reduce the
number of items on the list. In 1985, for instance, the United
States eliminated licensing requirements for low-technology
72. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED
STATES RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND KOREA: SECURITY ISSUES 12-13 (Comm. Print
1982) [hereinafter SECURITY ISSUES]; J. EMMERSON, ARMS, YEN & POWER: THE JAPA-
NESE DILEMMA 50 (1971); Jameson, supra note 21, at 4, col. 1. The language in the
section of the Japanese Constitution is as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.
KENP6 (Constitution) art. 9 (Japan), reprinted in JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE CON-
STITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES (1957 & reprint 1979).
73. SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 72, at lO-12;Japan and America, supra note 69, at
17-20; see also Crossette, Weinberger Holds Talks with Tokyo on Tough Issues, N.Y. Times,
June 29, 1987, at B14, cols. 1-2; Crossette, Weinberger Blames Japanese for Compromising
Security, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1987, at A14, col. 2 (discussing the possibility of an
increased role in the Persian Gulf).
74. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col 6. The United States and Soviet Union
have negotiated an arms treaty ("INF") that calls for a reduction in both sides' me-
dium-range nuclear missiles. Such an agreement, along with Gorbachev's policy of
glasnost (openness, public disclosure), has caused relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union to improve. See J. HOUGH, RUSSIA AND THE WEST: GORBACHEV
AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 201-15 (1988) (discussing the policy and implications
of glasnost).
75. Talking Econo-Military, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1988, at A27, col. 6; Farnsworth,
supra note 1, at D6, col. 6.
76. A Littler List, supra note 1, at 67; see also Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 6
(COCOM controls go beyond what is necessary).
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exports to COCOM member nations. 77 More recently, in Jan-
uary 1988, COCOM members spoke of "rationalizing" the list,
and then of "concentrating on the control of those goods and
technologies that are strategically significant."' 78 These meas-
ures are only two of several under consideration in the United
States and other COCOM member nations. 79 Nevertheless, at
present the list remains unworkable.
Not only have the presumptions underlying COCOM
changed, but there are also fundamental dissimilarities in the
laws, regulations, and procedures enacted by each COCOM
member nation to implement the informal multilateral agree-
ment." These dissimilarities exist between the United States
and its allies as well as between the allies themselves.8 This
lack of unity has weakened COCOM. For instance, nearly forty
years after formation, COCOM's members remain unable to
agree on a mutually acceptable definition of what is a "strate-
gic" or "militarily significant" item.82 In 1976, for example,
the U.S. Department of Commerce refused to permit the Cyril
Bath Company, a U.S. manufacturer of machine tools, to ex-
port a metal-forming press to the Soviet Union.83 Conversely,
the French government authorized a French company's sale of
nine identical presses without even consulting COCOM
rules.84 The United States complained to COCOM about
France's classification of the presses.8 5 The French govern-
77. Export to COCOM Countries, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,511, 38,512-14 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1985) (codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 371, 374, 386, 399); Bonker, supra note 4, at
101; Recent Development, supra note 2, at 197-98.
78. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 6.
79. See, e.g., Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R.
3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (bill calling for a reduction in the items on the U.S.
Commodity List). European Parliament Report, supra note 43, at 24 (a motion passed
banning unilateral export controls by the United States).
80. Aeppel, supra note 31, at 111-17.
81. Id.; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 88, 89.
82. Aeppel, supra note 31, at 117; Hunt, supra note 34, at 1288; McIntyre &
Cupitt, supra note 28, at 86.
83. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 33, at 904, 905; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra
note 30, at 102. For a complete discussion, see Export Licensing: Foreign Availability of
Stretch Forming Presses, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
84. Bingham &Johnson, supra note 33, at 905; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30,
at 102.
85. Bingham &Johnson, supra note 33, at 905; McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30,
at 102.
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ment reasoned that the Soviet Union already possessed the
technology, as evidenced by its aircrafts, and that France could
therefore ignore the relevant COCOM controls. s6 It has been
said that at present "[b]ubble gum is the only item with no
military significance. 87
Finally, the United States, for its part, has contributed to
the lack of unity among COCOM members by practicing what
United States Secretary of State George P. Shultz has termed
"light-switch diplomacy" 8 -trade policies that turn on and
off. Export controls have become part of a confusing diplo-
matic signaling process that weakens Western export markets89
and leaves Western exporters angry and confused.90 COCOM
members do not always feel inclined to follow the U.S. lead in
restricting technology to the Soviet Union, because they be-
lieve that U.S. policies are inconsistent and insensitive to West-
ern Europe's needs. 9'
III. CURRENT EFFORTS TO STRENGHTEN
EXPORT CONTROLS
The problems inherent in COCOM must be addressed on
86. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 33, at 905. France considered the technol-
ogy of the presses to be already available, thus making their sale to the Soviet Union
not very significant. Id.
87. Goldman, Why Not Sell Technology to the Russians?, TECH. REV., Feb./Mar.
1984, at 72. Strategic goods are those goods that have been determined to possess
military potential. See Mountain, Technology Exports and National Security, 32 FOREIGN
POL'Y 95, 95 (1978).
88. Shultz, Light-Switch Diplomacy, Bus. WK., May 28, 1979, at 24, 26.
89. Bucy, supra note 33, at 145.
90. Bingham &Johnson, supra note 33, at 910. The confusion can be especially
high when exporters are refused a license for a product they had previously shipped
to the same customer. Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 87, at 72 (the United States
sends confusing signals when, as the world leader in grain production, it is willing to
sell grain to the Soviet Union and then seek to ban other goods that are more inte-
gral to the European economy).
91. See Agnelli, East-West Trade: A European View, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 1016, 1017
(1980); Gonzalez, How To Increase Technology Exports Without Risking National Security-
An In-Depth Look at the Export Amendments Act of 1985, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
399, 452 (1986); McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 107 (indicating that COCOM
members do not like the unilaterally imposed U.S. restricitions); "West Germany,
France, Great Britain, Japan and Italy are all far more heavily dependent on foreign
trade than the US." Id. at 104; Vernon, The Fragile Foundations of East-West Trade, 57
FOREIGN AFF. 1035, 1049 (1979) (discussing the fact that many industrialized nations
would want to maintain distance from U.S. policy if the United States continues to
include politics in its trade decisions).
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a number of different levels: company-wide, national, and
multilateral. Inherent in these different levels is the need for
cooperation among the member nations.
A. Company- Wide Measures
On an immediate level, companies anxious not to repeat
the Toshiba/Kongsberg mistakes should incorporate further
controls into their corporate structure. Internal controls re-
cently introduced by Toshiba Corporation can serve as a
model.9 2 In its Stategic Products Control Program ("SPCP"),
the Toshiba Corporation has set up mechanisms at every inter-
nal level to identify products banned from export, as well as to
detect potential high-risk customers before sales are made.9"
It has also created a continuing education unit to ensure that
personnel understand the program.9 4 Identical requirements
have been imposed on the subsidiaries and affiliates of Toshiba
Corporation.9 5 Furthermore, additional levels of accountabil-
ity have been created inside the corporation's management to
assure compliance.96
The Toshiba Corporation has also created an Internal
Control Program ("ICP") to regulate the sale of U.S. parts
that it receives under a U.S. distribution license.97 The main
function of the ICP is to ensure compliance with the terms of
the U.S. export licences and with the export control laws and
regulations of the United States.98
B. National Measures
Each COCOM member nation should examine its national
export policies and, if necessary, amend them. The United
92. See Toshiba Unveils New Program To Prevent Illegal Exports (Sept. 9, 1987)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Asahi News Service file); Japanese Firms Take Action to Ensure
COCOM Compliance (Sept. 2, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Asahi News Service file);
Toshiba Corporation Will Set Up Export Examination Division, (July 8, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Asahi News Service file).
93. Toshiba Corp., Toshiba Strategic Products Control Program 15-25 (Aug.
28, 1988) [hereinafter Toshiba Program] (available at the Fordham International Law
Journal office).
94. Id. at 41-46.
95. Id. at 11-14.
96. Id. at 47-52.
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id.
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States, the European Community, and Japan have all begun to
consider changes in their export policies so as to improve the
balance between security and trade.
Recent U.S. legislation has sought to improve the func-
tioning of the Commmodity Control List. The Export Admin-
istration Amendments Act of 198599 ("1985 Act") urged that
the United States remove from the list items that no longer
contribute to the military capability of potentially hostile na-
tions. 0 The 1985 Act was an attempt to strike "a delicate bal-
ance between easing the burden of export controls on U.S.
manufacturers and protecting national security."' 0' Imple-
mentation of the export control policy enunciated in the 1985
Act, however, has been extremely slow.' 0 2 As a result, further
legislation has been proposed to redirect U.S. policy concern-
ing export controls. 0 3 A proposed amendment to the 1985
Act, now in conference between the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and the United States Senate, calls for a forty-percent re-
duction of the number of items on the U.S. Commodity Con-
trol List.' 0 4 Certain categories of items are to be eliminated
entirely from the U.S. Commodity Control List. These catego-
ries include low-technology goods that do not need COCOM
approval for shipment, medical instruments and equipment,
and goods that appear on the Commodity Control List.'0 5 The
changes are intended to free the U.S. government from moni-
99. Pub. L. No. 99-64, secs. 102-120, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99
Stat.) 120, 120-55 (amending Export Administration Act of 1979, §§ 2-7, 10-18, 20,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2406, 2409-2417, 2419 (1982)). See generally Feldman, The
Restructuring of National Security Controls Under the 1985 Amendments to the Export Adminis-
tration Act: Multilateral Diplomacy and the Extraterritorial Application of United States Law 21
STAN. J. INT'L L. 235 (1985); Gonzalez, supra note 91.
100. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, sec. 106, § 5(d), 50
U.S.C. App. § 2404(d) (Supp III 1985).
101. Bonker, supra note 4, at 101.
102. Id. at 102.
103. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 332(0, as amended (1987), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 27 (1987). "Due in large part to
the [Reagan] administration's failure to fully implement both the letter and spirit of
the [1985] Export Administration Act, the House Foreign Affairs Committee drafted
further amendments .... Bonker, supra note 4, at 102.
104. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 332(f), as amended (1987), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 27 (1987).
105. See id. sec. 332(e), as amended (1987), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 26-27 (1987).
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toring goods that have little strategic importance. 106
The U.S. Senate is also considering a proposal to impose
U.S. penalties on foreign companies that violate their own na-
tional export laws. 10 7 The European Parliament, however, ap-
pears unwilling to accept such extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws.' 08 The European Parliament passed a motion for a
resolution stating that the United States should consult
COCOM members before undertaking unilateral controls. 109
The European Parliament has also suggested that U.S. ex-
port controls have caused damage to Western unity and the
Western European economy," 0 and blamed the United States
for obstructing trade between the United States and Western
Europe."' Indeed, the European Parliament argued that uni-
lateral controls imposed by the United States have done more
to damage the economy of Western Europe than they have to
prevent the growth of military strength in Eastern-bloc na-
tions. 112 Some observers in the European Community have
taken the position that if the United States does not relax its
laws, "Europe will have no alternative but to compete" against
the United States in the field of technology.' 13 Accordingly,
the European Parliament has called for the dismantling of con-
trols on the transfer of technology among COCOM members
as well as among COCOM members and third countries that
respect COCOM rules." 4
Since the Toshiba incident was uncovered, the Japanese
government has taken steps to ensure that violations of
COCOM regulations do not occur again. The Prime Minister's
Cabinet has approved legislation that would tighten controls
on the export of strategic goods and stiffen penalities for viola-
tions.115 The legislation revises Japan's Foreign Exchange and
106. See Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 6.
107. On Trade, supra note 23, at A2, col. 1; see Amendment No. 355 to Ominibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, 133 CONG. REC. S8989 (1987).
108. On Trade, supra note 23, at A2, col. 2; European Parliament, supra note 43,
at 24; Feldman, supra note 99, at 242, 243; Gonzalez, supra note 91, at 452.
109. European Parliament Report, supra note 43, at 24.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 24.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Jameson, supra note 21, at 1; see Japanese Official Going to U.S. To Discuss
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Trade Control Act by providing for the review of exports that
might pose a threat to international peace and security." 6 The
Japanese government has also increased the size of the staff
that monitors such strategic exports." 7 In addition, the gov-
ernment has barred Toshiba from trading with Eastern-bloc
nations for a period of one year." 8 The MITI Minister person-
ally appealed to many Japanese exporters to comply with
COCOM rules." 9  As a further means of strengthening
COCOM compliance, the Japanese Foreign Ministry has re-
quested and been given the power to monitor the export of
sensitive goods. 2 0
Japanese business leaders, however, are strongly opposed
to the tightening of export controls.' 2' Many exporters fear
that the new controls will seriously hamper their ability to sell
high-technology goods to Eastern-bloc and other potentially
hostile nations. 22  Despite intense lobbying efforts by Japa-
nese businessmen, the Japanese Prime Minister's Cabinet
passed the new laws. 123
C. Multilateral Measures
Recent meetings of COCOM members have set the stage
for a "more realistic approach to export controls."'' 24 Groups
Toshiba Affair (July 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Asahi News Service file) [hereinaf-
ter Japanese Official].
116. See Japanese Official, supra note 115 (July 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Asahi News Service file).
117. Id.; Japan Takes Steps To Tighten Exports to the Soviet Bloc, Uuly 1, 1987)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Asahi News Service file) [hereinafter Tightened Exports].
118. Tightened Exports, supra note 117.
119. Id.
120. Jameson, supra note 21, at 1, col. 4. As an additional protective measure,
Japan should include the Ministry of Defense in the monitoring of exports and the
setting of policy. This would enhance COCOM compliance and improve interna-
tional security. See McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 93 (the role of the Foreign
Trade Ministries is stressed while the Defense Ministries play a minor role in the
trade restriction process, as compared to that of the Department of Defense in the
United States). But see Recent Development, supra note 2, at 198 n.6, 207 n.64 (the
U.S. Department of Defense's involvement in trade policy has been a source of frus-
tration in the United States' attempt to relax restrictions).
121. Japanese Firms Angered over Plans To Tighten Export Controls (July 31, 1987)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Asahi News Service file).
122. Id.
123. Jameson, supra note 21, at 1, col. 3 (the Cabinet has approved the legisla-
tion to tighten the export controls).
124. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 209.
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of technology experts, including those from the private sector,
are currently establishing a set of rules to evaluate what items
should be removed from the COCOM list.' 25 They are also
seeking to step up sanctions for those that violate the COCOM
rules.'2 6 COCOM officials describe this process as an attempt
at "building higher fences around fewer items."' 127
More fundamentally, however, COCOM members must
develop a generally acceptable definition of strategically-signif-
icant products for the COCOM list.' 28 The definition must, for
the first time, separate those items that are militarily significant
from those that are merely militarily applicable. 2 9 To this
end, European members of COCOM should consider institut-
ing a sub-group within COCOM to set unified positions con-
cerning trade policy 30 and to facilitate collaboration with the
United States. This organization would be analogous to
Eurogroup, a sub-group of European nations within NATO.''
1. NATO's Eurogroup
Eurogroup was formed in 1968 to strengthen and unify
Europe's contribution to NATO.1 2 It seeks to coordinate the
defense efforts of the Western European nations by providing
for the "harmonisation of European views on important polit-
ical/strategic questions."'133 The group is open to all Euro-
125. A Littler List, supra note 1, at 67.
126. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at D6, col. 6.
127. Id.
128. Aeppel, supra note 31, at 117; Hunt, supra note 34, at 1288; McIntyre &
Cupitt, supra note 30, at 86.
129. Mountain, supra note 87, at 95. "[S]ince the Soviets already have demon-
strated ability to produce rifles, U.S. technology involved in making rifle barrels, un-
less the result were markedly better or less expensive, could be acquired by the USSR
with no appreciable effect on American security." Id.
130. Among the different Western European nations there are different atti-
tudes and approaches concerning COCOM and technology transfers to the Eastern
bloc. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 88, 89 (the chart illustrates the different
views of the key COCOM members in their application and philosophy concerning
technology transfer to the East).
131. NATO INFORMATION SERV., THE EUROGROUP 3 (1975). It is not necessary to
include Japan as a member of the sub-group inside of COCOM because Japan has
historically been willing to follow the U.S. policies. McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30,
at 89. Although this does not guarantee that Japan will continue this policy, there is,
however, no effective domestic group inside Japan demanding the elimination ofJa-
pan's membership in COCOM. Id.
132. NATO INFORMATION SERV., supra note 131, at 10.
133. Id.
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pean members of NATO.134 Defense ministers from these ten
nations suggest topics for discussion and consult technical ex-
perts from each member nation who are most familiar with the
topics.' 35 All members of NATO, including non-Eurogroup
members, are briefed on the decisions made in the meet-
ings. 136
Each Eurogroup chairman is elected to a one-year term.
37
The Staff Group handles daily business and supervises the sub-
groups that specialize in specific NATO issues and projects. 138
Each sub-group is chaired by a Eurogroup member country.
39
Other non-Eurogroup members are allowed to take part in the
sub-group if the topic is of general concern.140
Eurogroup has enhanced cooperation among NATO
member nations. For instance, it has created a NATO Inte-
grated Communication System to enhance political and mili-
tary command during a crisis.' 4 ' Currently Eurogroup is work-
ing toward standardizing NATO military equipment and tac-
tics while allowing Western Europe to continue independent
research and development efforts.
142
2. COCOM's Sub-Group
Western European members in COCOM should consider
forming a sub-group similar to Eurogroup. Their aim would be
to unify and strengthen COCOM policies by agreeing on a sin-
gle Western European agenda. This agenda would recognize
the similar trade and security needs of Western European na-
134. Id. at 5, 9. Although eligible, Iceland is not a member of Eurogroup. 1
UNION OF INT'L Ass'NS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS F4431 (22d ed.
1985).
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 18. "[I]nformation on the work of the Eurogroup is distributed
throughout the Alliance; and access to information on the activities of the Eurogroup
is given to the NATO International Staffs." d.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id. at 16-17. The Staff Group normally consists of the Defense Counsellors
from the national delegations of member countries at NATO headquarters. Id.
139. Id. The Minister of Defense of the nation chairing the sub-group reports
on the progress of the sub-group to his colleagues at meetings. Id.
140. Id. at 17-18.
141. Id. at 22. The Eurogroup has also sponsored joint air, sea, and naval exer-
cises. Id. at 25.
142. Id. at 14.
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tions. 143 The effort would resolve a substantial part of the dis-
unity that exists among COCOM members.' 44 Furthermore,
the United States would no longer be compelled to negotiate
with many COCOM nations; it would have to be concerned
with only one group. This streamlining would aid COCOM as
an entity in solving such difficult questions as what constitutes
a strategic item.
The body would consist of the Ministers of Trade from the
sub-group's various members. The Ministers of Defense would
also participate as needed. A Trade Minister from one of the
member nations would chair the group and would be chosen
by the members.
The group would make use of the COCOM staff for ad-
ministrative duties. This arrangement would both save money
and maintain unity. The group would consult technical experts
so that the trade ministers could make informed decisions. Any
proposal would be brought to the COCOM meetings for pres-
entation and negotiation.
If a potential member nation decided not to join, the
group could still be effective. Any reduction in the disunity
among the Western European nations concerning trade re-
striction policies would be positive. Eurogroup has managed
to be effective although every eligible NATO nation originally
did not join. 145 It must be noted, however, that the COCOM
sub-group would aid only in providing a positive environment
for strengthening COCOM and resolving its problems.
COCOM ultimately can be improved only when its members
genuinely wish to cooperate.
CONCLUSION
The illegal sale of technology by Toshiba to the Soviet
Union illustrates the interdependency of the Western allies
and the need for a multilateral agreement that is mutually ben-
eficial. Such an agreement will arise only when the Western
nations devise a more workable approach to export controls.
COCOM is an important organization for the United States
143. See McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 30, at 104 (West Germany, France, Great
Britain, Japan, and Italy all rely far more on trade than does the United States).
144. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
145. NATO INFORMATION SERV., supra note 131, at 5.
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and its allies. Its survival depends, however, upon the mem-
bers' willingness to trim their export control lists and enforce
them more effectively. COCOM members have made recent ef-
forts to achieve these goals. These are credible efforts, but they
constitute only a beginning.
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